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The Critical Mass of Language: Post-Trinity Representation 
Daniel F. Spoth (Vanderbilt University) 
 
 
If the radiance of a thousand suns 
were to burst into the sky, 
that would be like 
the splendor of the Mighty One— 
I am become Death, the shatterer of worlds. 
—Bhagavad-Gita 
 
It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range 
with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be 
imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe 
most poorly and inadequately. 
—Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Farrell, Trinity test eyewitness account 
 
Now we are all sons of bitches. 
—Kenneth Tompkins Bainbridge, Trinity test eyewitness account 
 
 
As one story goes, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the director of the Manhattan Project, 
was so engrossed in Hindu mythology that he named the first atomic bomb test 
(Alamagordo, NM, July 16, 1945) “Trinity” after three of the most prominent deities in 
the religion: Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, and Shiva the Destroyer, and 
spoke (or thought) the above lines from the Bhagavad-Gita immediately after the 
explosion.
 
 James A. Hijiya, for one, has argued extensively for the influence of Hindu 
poetry and ethoi upon Oppenheimer in the time previous to Trinity, even suggesting that 
an analysis of said literature can help “to answer the question of why Hiroshima and 
 Nagasaki were destroyed.”  Hijiya explains: “without the inspiration of the Gita, 
Oppenheimer might not have been able or willing to direct Los Alamos. Without 
Oppenheimer’s skilled, determined direction, Los Alamos might not have produced an 
atomic bomb in time to be used on Japan” (Hijiya 126). Through Oppenheimer, the bomb 
becomes not merely a physical, technological entity, but a poetic creation, a fusion of 
science, morals, and aesthetics.   
Oppenheimer’s citation of the Gita has, in the years since Trinity, become perhaps 
the most well-known cultural moment of the Manhattan Project.  As early as the late 60s, 
Hijiya notes, his quotation had attained “legendary” status—some children learned it in 
elementary school, and it has given rise to the titles of at least two books, an article, and a 
documentary (Hijiya 126).  In this capacity, it also serves to make Trinity itself a 
legendary occurrence of sorts, an event closely related to, if not outright heralding, the 
end of the world.  Through this study of several other accounts of eyewitnesses to the 
Trinity test, as well as the reactions of two authors—William Faulkner and Richard 
Powers—and multiple critics to the birth of the bomb years afterward, I hope to examine 
several variations on a very simple question: where do we go after Trinity?  How does 
literature attempt not only to depict something that, for all intents and purposes, has never 
been seen before, and—more importantly—how does this affect what we already know 
about representation?  I want to contend, through the examples I am about to present, that 
what is at issue in post-Trinity representation is not necessarily the destructive power or 
the unprecedented magnitude of the nuclear explosion, but the possibility of allowing it to 
make all other human concerns obsolete, not the potential of destruction, but of 
forgetting. 
Oppenheimer was not the only one to find mythical valences in the Trinity 
explosion.  Other witnesses’ accounts of the test tend toward not only the expressions of 
awe, amazement, and horror that we generally associate with nuclear weapons, but also 
language of religious and poetic transport.  Trinity eyewitness rhetoric ranges from the 
terse and even-handed (Roger Serber’s “the grandeur and magnitude of the phenomenon 
were completely breath-taking”) to the almost hallucinatory—Thomas Farrell, perhaps 
the most quoted Trinity witness, later wrote: “the strong, sustained, awesome roar… 
warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare 
 tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty.”
i
  Spencer Weart, in Nuclear 
Fear, states that it seems to readers today that the Trinity witnesses “had seen something 
beyond the mortal realm… [William L.] Laurence believed that he and Oppenheimer and 
probably many others there had shared a profound religious experience.  He said later 
that witnessing the explosion was ‘like being present at the moment of creation when 
God said, ‘Let there be light,’’ or indeed like seeing the Second Coming of Christ” 
(Weart 101).  Even the official War Department release detailing the event claimed that it 
heralded “man’s entrance into a new physical world.”  Trinity becomes, in these 
accounts, a simultaneously scientific and spiritual event; splitting the atom is made 
congruent with cracking open the natural, divine order of the world.  Moreover, David 
Tietge theorizes in Flash Effect that, while Trinity invoked “new hopes and anxieties” in 
the minds of its viewers, it also “compounded old fears in the minds of scientists and 
leaders alike, evoking ancient dread in the Apocalypse and the darkness it would bring 
upon humanity” (Tietge 149). 
The device that was exploded during the Trinity test was a plutonium implosion 
bomb with the same design as Fat Man, the bomb later dropped on Nagasaki.  The heart 
of the bomb was a 150 cm sphere, with electronics and other equipment mounted 
externally.  The explosion it produced was equivalent to roughly 20 kilotons (20,000 
tons) of TNT, and left a crater of radioactive glass (“trinitite”) on the desert floor 3 
meters deep and 330 meters wide.  The Trinity engineers nicknamed the device “the 
Gadget.”  The name is apt; the Gadget contradicts the stereotype of the nuclear device 
hidden by a sleek, lethal casing; no brushed steel and LED monitors here, not even the 
mute, smooth brutality of Little Boy and Fat Man.  In its partially assembled form (as it is 
depicted in its most famous pictorial representation, fig. 1), the Gadget appears as an 
enormous steel sphere crisscrossed by wires, tubes, and hoses, and festooned with 
countless anonymous and vaguely sinister protuberances.  There is, moreover, something 
inscrutably and unidentifiably off about the Gadget, something that unsettles the mind; 
there are too many wires, too many uneven surfaces, even the vague assertion of flame 
and char in its non-homogenous surface—too much chaos, not enough order. Tietge 
compares the Gadget’s schematic to  
 a forgotten talisman, or a pendant used in some pagan religion to ward off 
evil by protecting its wearer, something that Indiana Jones might be 
searching for… [it] is reminiscent of a time when humanity considered 
itself the center of the universe, the place around which all else revolved—
a time before the disturbing revelations in science had tainted our rational 
faith and humbled us into realizing we were only one minute particle in a 
much, much larger scheme (Tietge 153). 
 
The potential human damage of the bomb, which for Tietge can be adumbrated in 
its appearance, both suggests and exceeds very old ideas of apocalyptic 
destruction; it de- and re-mystifies the idea of the end of the world by positing a 
vehemently artificial agent of that destruction (the Gadget) for the first time in 
history, while at the same time insisting upon the incapacity of the human mind to 
encompass its origins and effect.  For the first time, humanity faced the possibility 
of global annihilation by forces of its own making, yet those forces remained, to 
the majority of the public, inscrutable, opaque, the domain of a small cadre of 
experts.  In short, Trinity brought back the apocalypse (if it was ever gone), and 
that apocalypse was, to those who viewed the explosion as well as those who 
heard about it later, both unprecedented and all too familiar. 
 The stakes of Trinity are thus high not only in both moral and scientific (and even 
spiritual) terms, but also, significantly, in linguistic terms.  Farrell saw in the mushroom 
cloud “that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and 
inadequately,” and asserted that “words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting 
those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be 
witnessed to be realized.”  While Stephen Hilgartner, Richard C. Bell, and Rory 
O’Connor, in Nukespeak, insist that “in the thirty-six years since the atomic bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a new language has evolved…the language of nuclear 
development, a term we use to include the development of both nuclear weapons and 
nuclear power,” the accounts I have listed here seem to suggest that nuclear technology 
(and the possibility of nuclear war) invoke very basic and inherent problems of 
referentiality (Hilgartner et al viii).  Specifically, it seems that any prenuclear mimetic 
pattern becomes insufficient after Trinity (and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
soon afterward); words are insufficient tools to address the issues raised by the possibility 
 of atomic annihilation and, perhaps, insufficient to address what atomic annihilation even 
looks like.  Tietge theorizes that the linguistic rupture suggested by the Trinity test lies in 
its “sheer uniqueness.”  In contrast to the “familiar and recognizable” symbology of a 
prenuclear world filled with primarily identifiable and distinct images, “the atomic 
explosions at Los Alamos and Hiroshima, conversely, were totally new, totally foreign, 
and totally terrifying, and an equally new symbolic reaction was fostered” (Tietge 150).  
It may be that a completely novel, completely unprecedented, scientific development 
requires a new vocabulary to address it (certainly scientific progress requires new 
technical language to address itself), but the language surrounding Trinity seems to be 
distinctly poetic in nature—this breakthrough, this nuclear birth, is an event that defies 
not only mimetic replication in general, but literary description in particular.  The bomb 
requires symbologies, but not any symbologies that we can parse or internalize; any 
“nuclear poetics” must necessarily be incomprehensible, defamiliarized, unreadable.  
 However, there is a distinct tendency among post-World War II writers to regard 
the bomb as something that has not merely transformed, but somehow slain language, 
desiccated culture, and left the whole business to rot.  Five and a half years after Trinity, 
William Faulkner was accepting the Nobel Prize for literature in Stockholm.  Though he 
never directly mentions the bomb or even the then-burgeoning Cold War, his words have 
been read almost universally as having direct relevance to the writer’s task in the age of 
nuclear warfare: 
Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long 
sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems 
of the spirit. There is only one question: When will I be blown up? 
Because of this, the young man or woman writing today has forgotten the 
problems of the human heart in conflict with itself which alone can make 
good writing because only that is worth writing about, worth the agony 
and the sweat. (Faulkner 119)  
 
Faulkner suggests that the indivisible units of literary merit, the “problems” and 
“conflicts” of the spirit, have been fractured, obscured, even shattered in the same manner 
and by the same token that the atom itself has been split.  For Faulkner, nuclear war is 
antithetical to the literary spirit; again, we see the vexed relationship of the bomb and the 
poem, their simultaneous symbiosis and polarity.
ii
  Faulkner is not alone among literary 
figures in this assessment.  Wilson Harris, for instance, has placed the bomb within a 
 spectrum of technologies that are “fraught with ambiguity in [their] innermost 
content[s],” replete with both “beauty” and “danger,” yet remaining “dense within a 
civilization that is still blind to an innermost incandescence of evolving and changing 
alphabet of the psyche” (Harris 244).  The bomb is, here, if not antagonistic to literary 
production in general, at least a contentious entity, difficult to encompass with the written 
word.
iii
 
Given the fixed point of ontological contradiction and linguistic self-annihilation 
that nuclear poetics revolves around, then, it seems altogether more convenient to simply 
gloss the bomb, to regard it as a universally malevolent entity that swallows all energies 
directed toward it, and thus “write around” the problem.
iv
  Spencer Weart, for instance, 
has noted that most fiction writers who dealt with nuclear themes post-Trinity “spoke 
only vaguely about how the patterns of civilization might be encouraging and organizing 
destructive forces.  Many settled for depicting an authority as a mad scientist, which 
linked reactor and war themes but sidestepped real social questions.”
v
  Our urge is simply 
to demonize the bomb; it represents apocalyptic menace; words slide effortlessly off its 
frictionless surface; it is consigned to the bleak, blank places in literary representation—
the dystopian novel and the black comedy.
vi
   
I wish to excavate this notion of “talking around” the bomb in reference to the 
Manhattan Project in particular.  The invisible elephant in the room at Los Alamos in the 
mid-40s was the notion of human morality.  Oppenheimer told his engineers in 
November 1945: “if you are a scientist you cannot stop such a thing… If you are a 
scientist you believe… that it is good to turn over to mankind at large the greatest 
possible power to control the world and to deal with it according to its lights and values” 
(qtd. in Hijiya 137). The authority here rests with “mankind,” not the scientists who grant 
power to that indiscriminate, faceless aggregate; yet Oppenheimer himself has been 
repeatedly criticized for his lack of attention to the potential human costs of his 
theoretically alienated and innocent actions.
vii
  Hijiya writes: 
Despite announcing after Hiroshima that he had blood on his hands and 
that Manhattan Project scientists had known sin, Oppenheimer did not 
seem to experience profound remorse… Oppenheimer’s sorrow, such as it 
was, seems to have been only half-hearted and occasional. (Hijiya 158) 
 
Oppenheimer did not see himself as immoral or even amoral.  He saw the issue of morals, 
 at least insofar as they applied to basic life-or-death issues, as ancillary to science.  Not 
for him the idealistic statements of duty, responsibility, and obligation of the politicians 
and philosophers of the day.viii  He repeatedly emphasized his position as an agent, not an 
author: “I was not in a policymaking position at Los Alamos. I would have done anything 
that I was asked to do… if I had thought it was technically feasible” (qtd. in Hijiya 140).  
Oppenheimer might have believed that he had been untrue to some variety of moral code 
as a human being, but such concerns did not apply to him as a scientist; rather, the only 
morality, if it can be called such, known by the scientist is to perform the role of a 
scientist.
ix
 
 The problematic aspect (perhaps only one of many problematic aspects) of this 
self-exemption from moral concerns is that the bomb seems to be, socially if not literally, 
an automatically moral object.  In a manner that becomes extraordinarily familiar in the 
post-nuclear age, James Child insists, in Nuclear War: The Moral Dimension that “a key 
part of [the nuclear] perspective is moral in nature...  Moral issues are not only important, 
they are absolutely central” (Child 3).
x
  However, Child’s ire is, in truth, directed more 
toward the vindictive American mindset during wartime than the bomb itself; the bomb, 
and even the creation of the bomb, stand in metonymically for a fully-formed matrix of 
contextual woes.  In short, Child does not make claims about the bomb, or even, in the 
strictest sense, claims about nuclear technology; he makes claims about human 
tendencies.  Tietge addresses the issue somewhat more directly: 
science has profoundly affected not only the material changes the 
American language has undergone but also the spiritual nature of 
our social consciousness.  One might view these as complementary 
poles—whereas improvements in the state of human existence had 
undoubtedly come about as a result of science, so too had this 
reality changed our views of our relationship to the earth and the 
heavens (Tietge 47) 
 
Scientific developments, for Tietge, tend to create (and even, to some extent, come to be 
created by) spiritual developments.  Through this view, however, Trinity becomes not a 
spiritual event in itself, but a scientific event that inspires a spiritual event.  The bomb 
itself is not “spiritual”; the witnesses’ interpretations of it are.  The bomb itself, then, is 
not moral, has no spiritual bearing, is not a self-contained philosophical unit.  If we see 
the Book of Revelations in the Gadget’s schematic, in other words, it is not due to any 
 characteristic of the Gadget itself, but rather a function of shared sources of interpretation 
and anxiety—Harris’ ‘alphabet of the psyche.’ 
What Oppenheimer and his fellow Project engineers did, in effect, was turn 
themselves into the bomb, into the actors, beyond all notion of morality, who would carry 
the fire to mankind.  In an interview with Dartmouth professor Joseph J. Ermenc, Lew 
Kowarski, a French physicist, stated: “I am reasonably certain that the leading [Project] 
scientists were interested only in scientific achievement… One thing that I do not believe 
in the least, and never did, is that they had moral scruples” (Ermenc 184).  What all of 
this adds up to is that Oppenheimer’s manner of creating the social category of the 
scientist (and the mythological category of the bomb) is a means of excluding contrary 
discourses, talking past, in effect, any complications.  It posits a realm exempt from 
ostensibly universal laws, whether social, moral, or linguistic, a realm where conflicts can 
not only be ignored, but made completely inapplicable. 
I want to delineate the boundaries of this empty space by addressing the 
intersection of atomic referentiality and personal identity: how does the atomic tendency 
toward self-exemption from moral or social concerns translate into discursive formations 
of, for example, racial identity, where self-inclusion within a number of set categories is 
essential to self-image?  On the surface, there is nothing distinctly racial about the bomb 
or the Manhattan Project.
xi
  Richard Rhodes, the author of what is certainly the most 
well-known study of the project, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, asked, in “The Atomic 
Bomb in the Second World War,” “whether or not people died at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki depended not on their identities—whether combatants or noncombatants, 
Korean forced laborers, American prisoners of war, pregnant women, children, 
grandmothers, newborn babies or Shinto priests—but merely on the accident of their 
distance from ground zero that day” (qtd in Kelly 28).  If the bomb is racial, Rhodes 
suggests, it is racial by “accident.”   
The claim is difficult to contradict; the same amount of radiation will kill a human 
being of any race, color, or creed; the bomb seems to be the ultimate raceless device.  
However, as Child states, there are distinctly racial undertones to the rhetoric surrounding 
the use of the bomb: “there is in our attitude toward the comparison of nuclear war with 
World War II, and with all the cataclysms which went before it, more than a little 
 ethnocentrism.  Nuclear war means the infliction of millions of deaths upon us—
Americans—upon our cities and our people” (Child 44).  Child sees nuclear war as an 
ethnological wake-up call for Anglo-Americans, a cataclysmic event that brings its 
audience in line with a previously invisible panoply of distinctly racial suffering; for the 
first time, he states, white Americans are faced with the same “omnipresent danger of 
violent death, or the wrenching dislocation of their ordinary lives, or both” that a history 
of oppression entails to other races (Child 46).  It seems evident, then, that the bomb 
simultaneously elides racial valences in its capacity as an inanimate weapon with no 
racial “mind” of its own and accrues those valences through the necessity of its 
deployment by (racialized) individuals.  However, I would like to nuance this argument 
by claiming that, just as the rationality, anonymity, and teleological necessity of a life of 
science permitted Oppenheimer and his contemporaries to “talk past” morality, the bomb 
gives us a way of “talking past” race.  To make this claim, I turn finally to fiction, and 
specifically to Richard Powers’ The Time of Our Singing, which fuses racial and nuclear 
anxieties in one narrative. 
 On its most basic level, Powers’ novel concerns itself with the life stories of 
Jonah, Joseph, and Ruth, the children of David Strom, a Jewish German physicist, and 
Delia Daley, an African-American concert singer.  All three children possess both 
different skin tones and different perspectives on their racial position in the world.  As 
Jonah follows (and exceeds) his mother’s vocation as a singer, attempting to escape, 
elide, or simply ignore the obstacles imposed by his dark skin, and Ruth becomes 
increasingly involved in the civil rights movement, Joseph is left suspended between 
poles of whiteness and blackness, action and inaction; his narrative is one of identity.  
Like the uninscribed ID bracelet that he quixotically gives his childhood sweetheart, he 
regards himself most often as a cipher, a blank, something that should have a distinct, 
vital identity, but instead is defined by lack.   
I want to focus specifically on the character of David Strom, however, and his 
conflation of the forces of race and science.  In response to Jonah’s childhood 
interrogation of his racial “place” in society, David asserts, as he often does over the 
course of the novel, relativity: 
 ‘You are a Negro, right?  And Da’s… some kind of Jewish guy.  What 
exactly does that make me, Joey, and Root?’… Mama looked off into 
whatever place lay beyond sound.  Da, too, shifted.  They’d been waiting 
for the question, and every other one that would follow, down the years to 
come.  ‘You must run your own race,’ our father pronounced (Powers 29). 
 
David’s statement suggests both indeterminacy and individual identity-formation; race, 
for him, is what Jonah, or Joseph, or Ruth make of it.  His attempts elsewhere in the book 
to reduce racial questions to issues of probability, mathematic formulae, or even, by 
analogy, particle physics, strike the reader as alternately comical, baffling, insightful, and 
misguided.  He defines his children’s ethnic dilemma as “just mathematics!  They can be 
A and not B.  They can be B and not A.  They can be A and B.  Or they can be neither A 
nor B,” to which the narrator wryly responds: “three more choices than this child would 
ever get” (Powers 287).  David’s scientific rhetoric permits him to elide racial and 
material realities—by transfiguring the problem with the discourse of physics and 
probability, he makes the issue an equation, a riddle with a single, if not definite, answer.  
In short, mathematics permits him to claim that “‘There is no such thing as race.  Race is 
only real if you freeze time, if you invent a zero point for your tribe.  If you make the past 
an origin, then you fix the future.  Race is a dependent variable’” (Powers 94).  Science in 
Powers’ novel elides race, defeats it, reduces it to finical judgments and syllogisms. 
 It might be remarked that this is too easy, too reductive, too ignorant not only of 
the ephemeral, even empirically inaccessible, minutiae of race, and indeed this turns out 
to be the case for David Strom.  Toward the end of the book, Powers reveals that the 
endless, seemingly chaotic mathematical labyrinth he has been traversing is in fact 
associated with the Manhattan Project; David has been inadvertently lending his talent to 
the making of the bomb.  Despite Delia’s manic, compensatory self-assurance that “he 
can’t have contributed much to this bomb.  You can’t turn an atom into twenty thousand 
tons of TNT on anything so imaginary as time,” David becomes inevitably associated 
with the entire Project (Powers 409).  Moreover, he is forced to confront the social and 
specifically racial consequences of his actions following Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 
form of a critique from his own father; “He challenged my war work… he said those 
bombings were as racial as Hitler.  I said I didn’t work on the bombings.  I did not have 
anything to do with those decisions.  I said such use wasn’t about white and dark.  He 
 said everything—the whole world—was about white against dark” (Powers 465).  
David’s relativistic scientific racial immunity dissipates with the dust of the bombed 
Japanese cities.   
However, David’s reaction to the necessity of the race question is not to draw 
defining lines and delineate hard racial distinctions, but instead to abdicate the 
responsibility, to insist that others adopt the burden of ethnic identity.  He and Delia 
resolve the vexed issue of their children’s race by determining to “raise the children 
beyond race… we don’t name them.  They’ll do that for themselves… we’re going to 
raise them for when everybody will be past color” (Powers 424, emphasis mine).  This 
statement posits a utopian ethnic space, an area where race is not irrelevant but simply 
nonpresent, the same imagined moral space that Oppenheimer and the Trinity scientists 
occupied.  Though race may be an imperative (as David realizes), it is an imperative that 
operates in a register transcended (or imagined to be transcended) by these characters—
the time when “everybody will be past color.”  This is a distinctly post-Trinity, a post-
Hiroshima, mindset: the bomb does not, strictly speaking, destroy race any more than it 
solves racial issues; however, it claims the possibility of existing outside of it, beyond it, 
the notion of talking past the issue. 
 Faulkner’s antidote to the possibility of nuclear annihilation was a return to “the 
old verities and truths of the heart,” without which “any story is ephemeral and doomed.”  
He famously “decline[d] to accept the end of man,” instead positing an ethos of 
endurance in which man’s immortality is assured “not because he alone among creatures 
has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and 
sacrifice and endurance” (Faulkner 119).  Priscilla Wald, in a recent address to the annual 
Faulkner and Yoknapatawpha Conference in Oxford, MS, correctly identified Faulkner’s 
fear of nuclear annihilation as a social rather than a material fear.  For Faulkner, she 
states, 
…apocalyptic fear is the fear of social death writ large, since it leaves no 
one to tell the story that bestows social existence and the measure of 
immortality that memory confers.  The histories of racial slavery and 
colonization offer dramatic examples of social death and insist on its 
fundamental racialization, not just in Faulkner’s South, but in the 
contemporary U.S.  As Faulkner’s invocation of those histories suggests, 
“apocalypse” refers not only to the literal annihilation of a population, but 
 also to the disappearance of a culture with which one identifies. (Wald 50) 
 
The real threat for Faulkner is not death, not the possibility of being, as he tersely stated, 
“blown up,” but the possibility of forgetting, the notion that very real and tangible events 
in the past can be elided by the threat, the inhumanity, even the mass of the bomb itself.  
This is the same potential, I believe, that Oppenheimer’s placement of himself beyond 
morality and David Strom’s placement of his children beyond race suggests—an 
imaginary space, a space not just without but beyond large social concerns.  It is also, 
ultimately, the space that both Oppenheimer and Powers reject in favor of (transformed) 
reintegration into the world of morality and racial complexity.   
The argument of the atom bomb, and perhaps one of the reasons why it has 
proven so attractive a target for literary and pop cultural representation, is the argument 
not only for the obsolescence of older means of warfare, but the obsolescence of older 
means of artistic representation, creation, and even thought.  Oppenheimer, in his later 
years, eschewed his ivory tower in favor of speaking out, on profoundly moral grounds, 
against the development of the hydrogen bomb.
xii
  The threat became, for him, not one of 
annihilation per se, but of forgetting the intense ideological ramifications of the bomb, 
the same threat that Faulkner outlines and that Powers’ novel eventually realizes.  These 
three individuals, whether immediately or gradually, came to deny residence within the 
imaginary space I have alluded to earlier, the hermetic realm in which it is possible to 
talk past issues like race, morality, and even representation.  The crisis of representation, 
the anxiety felt by the authors and scientists I have studied here, is not the threat that life 
in the world might become impossible after Trinity, but that life in this imaginary space, 
the space where every aspect of life is rendered insignificant, might be possible.   
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1—the Gadget, partial assembly 
 
 
 
Image courtesy of Los Alamos National Laboratories.
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 Notes 
 
                                                 
i Eyewitness accounts are taken from the “Trinity Remembered” archive at 
http://www.trinityremembered.com/documents/index.html 
ii For more, see Priscilla Wald’s “Atomic Faulkner” in Faulkner’s Inheritance, eds. 
Joseph Urgo and Ann Abadie. 
iii
 This rhetorically antagonistic relationship between nuclear weapons and high culture 
finds a correlate in post-Holocaust writing and certain postcolonial writings; these 
cataclysms, again of purely human origins, seem to induce discursive vacuums from 
which artistic creation, at least initially, tends to shrink.  For more, see Elaine Martin’s 
“Re-Reading Adorno: The ‘after-Auschwitz’ Aporia” in FORUM, Spring 2006, and 
George Handley’s “A New World Poetics of Oblivion” in Look Away!: The U.S. South in 
New World Studies, 2004. 
iv
 David S. Greenwald and Steven J. Zeitlin have put together a fascinating compilation 
of attitudes toward the “nuclear taboo” in Cold War America in No Reason to Talk About 
It: Families Confront the Nuclear Taboo.  Greenwald and Zeitlin want to confront the 
notion that  “what one individual thinks, or one family thinks, or even what one country 
thinks does not make a difference” in the Atomic Age. (Greenwald / Zeitlin 61) 
v (Weart 416).  For an engaging if somewhat oblique investigation of the literary 
character of the Japanese bombings in particular, see Outcry from the Inferno: Atomic 
Bomb Tanka Anthology, edited by Jiro Nakano.  The Japanese tankas composed by 
survivors of the explosions oftentimes evince something like complete personal 
transfiguration.  “I will overcome / the shattering of my mind / by the atomic bomb. / I 
shall decide the redirection / of my remaining life” (Nakano 49). 
vi
 See, for example, Dr. Strangelove, On the Beach, Grave of the Fireflies, When the 
Wind Blows, or Atomic Café.  For all of its referential difficulties, the bomb has proven to 
be an immensely profitable subject for both high and low culture.  Disbelievers need 
merely to glance at Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, in which the bomb (albeit not 
an atomic bomb) acts as the site of inspiration, anxiety, symbolism, and parody all at 
once. 
vii
 Ironically, Oppenheimer has also been criticized for being too moral by other 
scientists, perhaps most notably the famous physicist I. I. Rabi, who believed that “too 
great a dose of ethical culture can often sour the budding intellectual who would prefer a 
more profound approach to human relations and man’s place in the universe,” and 
lamented, at Oppenheimer’s funeral, that the Project’s director “was overeducated in 
those fields which lie outside the scientific tradition, such as his interest in religion, in the 
Hindu religion in particular, which resulted in a feeling of mystery of the universe that 
surrounded him like a fog. He saw physics clearly, looking toward what had already been 
done, but at the border he tended to feel there was much more of the mysterious and 
novel than there actually was.” (Rabi 7) 
viii
 An April 25, 1945 memo discussed by the directors of the project with President 
Truman states: “the development of this weapon has placed a certain moral responsibility 
upon us which we cannot shirk without any very serious responsibility for any disaster to 
civilization which it would further” (Stoff, Fanton, Williams 96). 
                                                                                                                                                  
ix
 Jeff Hughes, in The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb, has shrewdly 
suggested that the nuclear scientists toward the end of the war only became truly 
interested in moral issues once their immediate usefulness had been exhausted: “despite 
later accounts which often emphasized the observers’ philosophical or moral reflections 
on the Trinity test, the scientists’ immediate reactions were first of euphoria and second 
of trying to obtain as much information as possible about the explosion… there had been 
stiff opposition to the decision to drop the bombs on cities from the Chicago scientists, 
who had found themselves at something of a loose end after the wind-down of the 
plutonium work and had turned to thinking about broader moral and political questions 
surrounding atomic weapons” (Hughes 92). 
x
 Perhaps the most telling evidence of the moral interest in nuclear warfare post-Trinity is 
the significant interest that several branches of the Christian church in America and 
elsewhere took vis-à-vis disarmament and proliferation of nuclear devices.  For more, see 
Ethics in the Nuclear Age: Strategy, Religious Studies, and the Churches, edited by Todd 
Whitmore. 
xi
 There are even those who have attempted to make the enclosed space of the Project a 
symbol for racial cooperation and equality; since Los Alamos staffed scientists of almost 
every racial background (many of them émigrés from the European genocide), there is an 
impulse to regard the Project as “the borderless state that recognizes no passports, the 
country of particles and numbers” (Powers 330). 
xii
 And was subsequently indicted and stripped of his security clearance on grounds of 
“Communist sympathies” by the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1953. 
